Difference between revisions of "Yilin Mo, 25 February 2013"

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(Created page with "=== Monday, February 25th === Yinlin Mo, from Carnegie Mellon, will be visiting campus on February 25th and will give a talk. Sign up for available meeting times. * 9:30 a...")
 
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Revision as of 23:22, 20 February 2013

Monday, February 25th

Yinlin Mo, from Carnegie Mellon, will be visiting campus on February 25th and will give a talk. Sign up for available meeting times.


  • 9:30 am: Richard, 109 Steele Lab
  • 10:15 am: Open
  • 11 am: Open
  • 20:00 pm: Seminar, 114 Steele Lab
  • 1:15 pm: Open
  • 2pm: Open
  • 2:45pm: Open
  • 3:30pm: Open
  • 4:15pm: Open
  • 5pm: Richard


Title: Secure Estimation and Control in Cyber-Physical Systems

Abstract:

The concept of Cyber-Physical System (CPS) refers to the embedding of sensing, communication, control and computation into the physical spaces. Today, CPSs can be found in areas as diverse as aerospace, automotive, chemical process control, civil infrastructure, energy, health-care, manufacturing and transportation, most of which are safety critical. Any successful attack to such kind of systems can cause major disruptions, leading to great economic losses and may even endanger human lives. The first-ever CPS malware (called Stuxnet) was found in July 2010 and has raised significant concerns about CPS security. The tight coupling between information and communication technologies and physical systems in CPS introduces new security concerns, requiring a rethinking and reexamining of the commonly used objectives and methods. In this talk, we provide two different cyber-physical threat models of CPS and analyze the performance of CPS under malicious attacks. We also develop new secure and resilient estimation and control algorithms to counter the attack.