Difference between revisions of "Pablo Parrilo, Nov 2010"

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{{agenda begin}}
{{agenda begin}}
{{agenda item|9:30a|Open}}
{{agenda item|9:30a|Open}}
{{agenda item|10:15a|Open}}
{{agenda item|10:15a|Richard Murray (109 Steele)}}
{{agenda item|11:00a|Seminar: 214 Steele}}
{{agenda item|11:00a|Seminar: 214 Steele}}
{{agenda item|12:00p|Lunch with John,  (faculty: add your name to the list if you want to come)}}
{{agenda item|12:00p|Lunch with John,  Keith, Houman, Steven L, Ather (faculty: add your name to the list if you want to come)}}
{{agenda item|1:30p|Open}}
{{agenda item|1:30p|Nader (Annenberg) }}
{{agenda item|2:15p|Open}}
{{agenda item|2:15|John Doyle (Annenberg)}}
{{agenda item|3:00p|Richard Murray (109 Steele)}}
{{agenda item|2:30p|CDS 212 (Annenberg)}}
{{agenda item|3:45p|Open}}
{{agenda item|4:00p|Genti (Annenberg)}}
{{agenda item|4:15p|Open}}
{{agenda item|4:45p|Necmiye (Steele)}}
{{agenda end}}
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Latest revision as of 05:30, 23 November 2010

Pablo Parrilo will be visiting Caltech on 23 Nov 2010 (Tue). Sign up for a time to meet with him below.


9:30a   Open
10:15a   Richard Murray (109 Steele)
11:00a   Seminar: 214 Steele
12:00p   Lunch with John, Keith, Houman, Steven L, Ather (faculty: add your name to the list if you want to come)
1:30p   Nader (Annenberg)
2:15   John Doyle (Annenberg)
2:30p   CDS 212 (Annenberg)
4:00p   Genti (Annenberg)
4:45p   Necmiye (Steele)



Pablo A. Parrilo (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

Tuesday, November 23, 2010
11:00 AM to 12:00 PM
Steele 214

Exact potential games are those where the preferences of the strategy profiles of the different players are globally consistent, and therefore the players' payoffs can be aggregated through a joint function. In this talk, we analyze the general situation where there are local or global inconsistencies between the preferences of the different players. For this, we introduce a natural decomposition of multiplayer games in terms of potential and harmonic components. Besides its intrinsic interest, this decomposition facilitates the study of equilibrium and convergence properties of natural game dynamics. We discuss the implications for cooperative control problems, pricing schemes, and efficiency loss, and illustrate the results and techniques through an example of power control in wireless networks. Joint work with Ozan Candogan, Ishai Menache, and Asu Ozdaglar (MIT), http://arxiv.org/abs/1005.2405