

Stochastic Networked Embedded Systems

Specification and Analysis

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


AFOSR MURI: V&V

With Caltech (Murray, Doyle, Chandy and Parillo)

Outline

- Concurrency
 - Graph Grammars (Nondet, embedded)
 - Guarded Command Programs
 - Guarded Command Programs with Rates
- Markov Processes from GCPWR
- Composition
- Linearly Disabled Markov Processes
- Robustification




Concurrency



- In CS, typically:
- Not real time
 - No continuous state
 - Performance not covered
 - Limited stochastic tools

Concurrency and Control

$$\mathbf{u}_i(\gamma) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } i.mode = \text{east} \\ -1 & \text{if } i.mode = \text{west} \\ \sum_{j \in N(i)} \mathbf{x}_j - \mathbf{x}_i & \text{if } i.mode = \text{follow} \end{cases}$$



Tools: Lyapunov + Hybrid Systems +
Concurrency + Temporal Logic

Toyota Research

J. M. [McNew](#), E. [Klavins](#) and M. [Egerstedt](#). Solving Coverage Problems with Embedded Graph Grammars. *Hybrid Systems: Computation and Control*. 2007.

S. Waydo, J. Hauser and R. Bailey, E. [Klavins](#) and R. Murray, **UAV as a Reliable Wingman: A Flight Demonstration**, *IEEE Transactions on Control Systems Technology*, Jul. 2007, Vol. 15, No. 4, pp. 680--688.


CCL: A Guarded Command Programming Language

```
program send_msg (i) :={  
  
  needs mode, x, toRobot, msg;  
  
  (mode = "idle") & (rand(1000) = 1) :{  
    toRobot := (i + rand( N - 1 ) + 1) % N,  
  
    send([to := toRobot , from := i, x := x,  
        ack := false]),  
  
  };  
};
```

E. Klavins, **A Language for Modeling and Programming Cooperative Control Systems**, *Proceedings of the International Conference on Robotics and Automation*. May 2004, pp. 3403- 3410.

E. Klavins and R. Murray, **Distributed Algorithms for Cooperative Control**, *IEEE Pervasive Computing*. 2004, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 56--65.

Guarded Command Programs with Rates



General syntax:

guard : rule : rate

E.g.

pos(i) = 1 : pos(i)' = pos(i) + 1 : 2.5


The rate is the probability that this rule will execute in time $[t, t+dt)$ given that its guard is true at time t .

N. Napp and E. Klavins, **Robust by Composition: Programs for Multi-Robot Systems**, submitted to ICRA 2010.

The rate guard in CCL

```
program drunkard( k ) := {  
    X:=0;  
    (rate k){ X++ };  
};  
  
program main() := updatedT() + drunkard( 1.0 ) + drunkard( 2.0 );
```

Needed by rate




The Markov Process of a GCPWR

Each guarded command program corresponds to a infinitesimal generator matrix $\mathbf{Q}(\Psi)$.

$\mathbf{A}_{i,j}(\psi) = r$, if $(i, j) \in a \wedge i \in g$ and 0 otherwise.

$$\mathbf{A}(\Psi) = \sum_{\psi \in \Psi} \mathbf{A}(\psi)$$

$$\mathbf{Q}(\Psi) = \mathbf{A}(\Psi) - \text{diag}(\mathbf{A}(\Psi)\mathbf{1})$$



Semantics of Program Composition

Composition: $\mathbf{A}(\Psi_1 \cup \Psi_2) = \mathbf{A}(\Psi_1) + \mathbf{A}(\Psi_2)$
 $\mathbf{Q}(\Psi_1 \cup \Psi_2) = \mathbf{Q}(\Psi_1) + \mathbf{Q}(\Psi_2)$

Scaling: $\mathbf{A}(\alpha\Psi) = \alpha\mathbf{A}(\Psi)$
 $\mathbf{Q}(\alpha\Psi) = \alpha\mathbf{Q}(\Psi)$

Reverse: $\mathbf{A}(\Psi^R) = \mathbf{A}(\Psi)^T$
 $\mathbf{Q}(\Psi^R) = \mathbf{A}(\Psi)^T - \text{diag}(\mathbf{A}(\Psi)^T \mathbf{1})$

Expressibility

Without Rates

$\Phi_1 \cup \Phi_1$: Arbitrary fair interleavings may result in incorrect behaviors

With Rates

$a\Phi_1 \cup b\Phi_2$: Can balance the relative rates at which programs run


The Control Problem

$\Phi_{\text{plant}} \cup u\Phi_{\text{control}}$: Find $u(t)$ so that some desired performance statistics result

Robustification

$\Phi_1 \cup \varepsilon\Phi_2$: Add a small amount of P2 to make P1 more robust

Linearly Disabled Markov Processes



$$u \in [0, 1]$$

Some uncertainty in Q

$$Q = Q_0 + uQ_1$$

$$y = g(x)$$



Some performance measure

Controllable Region

$$Q_{u=0} = Q_0$$

$$Q_{u=1} = Q_0 + Q_1$$

$$[y_{u=0}, y_{u=1}]$$

Control Problem

Robustly stabilize $E[y^*]$

PI Control

Given a guarded command program with rates

$$\Phi_{\text{plant}} \cup u\Phi_{\text{control}}$$

Define

$$\dot{x} = f(\mathbf{q}, x) = \gamma(y(\mathbf{q}) - y^*)$$




$$h(x) = \begin{cases} 0, & x \leq 0 \\ x, & 0 < x \leq 1 \\ 1, & 1 < x. \end{cases}$$

$$u = h(x)$$





Theorem: If y^* is in the controllable region, then $E[y] \rightarrow y^*$. The variance is tunable via gamma.

Interpretation: Can balance the rates at which two guarded command programs run so that a desired performance level is guaranteed.

Example



$$u = h(z), \quad \dot{z} = \gamma(N_{P_{12}} - y^*)$$



Expressibility

Without Rates

$\Phi_1 \cup \Phi_1$: Arbitrary fair interleavings may result in incorrect behaviors

With Rates

$a\Phi_1 \cup b\Phi_2$: Can balance the relative rates at which programs run

The Control Problem

$\Phi_{\text{plant}} \cup u\Phi_{\text{control}}$: Find $u(t)$ so that some desired performance statistics result

Robustification

$\Phi_1 \cup \varepsilon\Phi_2$: Add a small amount of P2 to make P1 more robust

Robustification

$$\Phi_1 \cup \varepsilon\Phi_2$$

A high performance program describes how the system should work when everything is functioning normally.

A safe, but low performance program works in more situations, but is slow.

Robustification

$$\Phi_1 \cup \varepsilon\Phi_2$$


Theorem 5. *Given two Q-matrices A and B with the same, unique recurrent state s^* , then for any $\delta > 0 \exists \varepsilon > 0$ such that for $C = A + \varepsilon B$*

- 1) $|\lambda_2(A) - \lambda_2(C)| < \delta$,
- 2) $\kappa_C(\{s^*\}^C, s^*) \geq \kappa_B(\{s^*\}^C, s^*)$,
- 3) $\pi_C = \pi_A$.


Increased connectivity
means alternative paths
around fault modes




• Stochastic Factory Floor (SFF)




It's a skyscraper!



It's a bridge!




Current Hardware



NSF: EFRI Reconfigurable
Systems
With MIT (Rus), U. Penn (Yim)
and Cornell (Lipson)

Programmed in CCL


```
(rate k)&(checkFilled THIS NODE ) & (checkEmpty NORTH NODE) : {  
  moveNode NORTH  
};
```




```
(rate k)&(checkFilled THIS TRUSS_X ) & (checkEmpty THIS TRUSS_Y) : {  
  moveTruss TRUSS_X THIS TRUSS_Y  
};
```



```
(rate k)&(checkFilled THIS TRUSS_X ) & (checkEmpty NORTH TRUSS_X) : {  
  moveTruss TRUSS_X NORTH TRUSS_X  
};
```




Reconfiguration Program




```
main() := disassemble() + routing() + building();
```

Bowtie Architecture






Routing Program




```
main() := disassemble() + routing() + building();
```


Flow Field: $\psi_{flow}(k)$



```
program east(k) := {
    (rate k) & (checkFilled THIS NODE) & (checkEmpty EAST NODE) : {
        moveNode EAST
    };};
```






```
program north(k) := {
    (rate k) & (checkFilled THIS NODE) & (checkEmpty NORTH NODE) : {
        moveNode NORTH
    };};
```



```
program south(k) := {
    (rate k) & (checkFilled THIS NODE) & (checkEmpty SOUTH NODE) : {
        moveNode SOUTH
    };};
```

Random Walk: random (k)




```

program southEast(k) := {
  (rate (k / 2)) & (checkFilled THIS NODE) & (checkEmpty EAST NODE):{
    moveNode EAST
  };
  (rate (k / 2)) & (checkFilled THIS NODE) & (checkEmpty SOUTH NODE):{
    moveNode SOUTH
  };
};

```


Robustifying Programs

```
robust (k) := flow( 0.9*k ) + random (0.1 * k);
```



flow(1)









random(1)



robust(1)

Robustness vs. Performance



flow (1)



random (1)



robust (1)

Expressibility

Without Rates

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Robustification



$\Phi_1 \cup \varepsilon\Phi_2$: Add a small amount of P2 to make P1 more robust

Current Work

- GCPWR
- Formalizing probabilistic failure models
 - Synthesis of minimal robustification programs
 - Automated reasoning about GCPWR

- David Thorsley's Work
- Observation of internal state in guarded command programs
 - Diagnosis
 - Hypothesis Testing

- Fayette Shaw's
- Distributed Task Allocation



Future Questions

- How can we use randomness to
 - improve system robustness?
 - make systems easier to verify?
 - yield safe, essentially deterministic behavior?
- How do we reason about stochastic software / control systems?
 - stochastic Lyapunov functions
 - local to global results for stochastic processes